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OPINION OF THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 This appeal concerns the continued vitality of the so-
called Ilfeld doctrine for interpreting the Internal Revenue 
Code.  Taken from Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 
62 (1934), this doctrine teaches that “the Code should not be 
interpreted to allow [the taxpayer] ‘the practical equivalent of 
a double deduction’ … absent a clear declaration of intent by 
Congress.”  United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 684 
(1969) (quoting Ilfeld, 292 U.S. at 68).  Duquesne Light 
Holdings, Inc. (“DLH”) and its subsidiaries (DLH and its 
subsidiaries are variously referred to as the “Duquesne 
group,” the “Duquesne entities,” or simply “Duquesne”) 
appeal the Tax Court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
Internal Revenue Service based on the Ilfeld doctrine.  In 
particular, Duquesne challenges the Tax Court’s holding that 
the consolidated entities affiliated with DLH claimed a 
double deduction for certain losses incurred by its 
AquaSource subsidiary and thus disallowed $199 million of 
those losses (all numbers are rounded).  As we conclude that 
the Tax Court properly applied the Ilfeld doctrine, we affirm.1 
I. BACKGROUND 
 The Duquesne entities, including DLH and 
AquaSource, filed their tax returns as a consolidated taxpayer, 
                                                          
 1 The Tax Court had jurisdiction to hear this case 
under 26 U.S.C. § 6213 and we have jurisdiction to review its 
judgment per 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). 
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meaning they filed a single tax return reflecting their joint tax 
liability.  Despite allowing corporate groups to file a single 
return, the applicable tax laws require a mixed approach of 
calculating some aspects of the group’s taxes as though the 
entities were a single taxpayer and calculating others as if 
each member of the group were a separate taxpayer.  13 
Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation § 46:1 (2016 ed.).  
This approach—called the “consolidated return regime”—
reflects how the IRS has chosen to exercise its broad 
discretion to issue regulations for consolidated returns “to 
reflect the income-tax liability” of the group and “to prevent 
avoidance of such tax liability.”  26 U.S.C. § 1502.  
 The possibility of separate treatment nonetheless 
creates the potential for the group to deflect its tax liability by 
using stock sales to claim a second deduction for a single loss 
at the subsidiary (such as a loss on the subsidiary’s sale of an 
asset).  See Lawrence Axelrod, 1 Consolidated Tax Returns 
§ 18:2 (4th ed. 2015).  This is known as a double deduction, 
or more technically as loss duplication.  It may occur because 
by definition the parent company in a corporate group owns 
all or most of the stock in its subsidiaries.  See 26 U.S.C. § 
1504(a).  All else being equal, the value of the parent’s stock 
depends on the value of the subsidiary’s assets.  If the 
subsidiary’s assets decline in value, the parent’s stock will as 
well.  If the subsidiary sells those assets (which may include 
stock and other securities) at a loss, it is generally able to 
claim a deduction for those losses.  See 26 U.S.C. § 165(a) 
(“General rule.--There shall be allowed as a deduction any 
loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated 
for by insurance or otherwise”).  If the parent and subsidiary 
are viewed as separate entities, the parent is able to sell its 
stock of the subsidiary at a loss and claim a deduction for that 
loss as well.  See Axelrod, supra, § 18:2.  But in fact the 
overall group has only suffered one economic loss though it 
was deducted twice.  For example, suppose that parent P has a 
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wholly owned subsidiary S and its investment in S’s stock is 
worth $100.  After one of S’s assets declines in value by $50, 
S sells the asset and deducts a $50 loss under § 165.  P’s stock 
value in S also declines by $50, and if P and S are viewed 
separately, P is able to sell its stock in S and deduct a further 
loss of $50 under § 165.  The consolidated group is thus able 
to deduct $100 for a single economic loss of $50 resulting 
from the decline in value of S’s asset. 
 To prevent double deductions, the IRS has 
promulgated numerous regulations requiring that consolidated 
taxpayers be treated as a single entity for stock sales.  Of 
particular relevance to the events of this case is the former 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20.  Starting in the early 1990s, it 
prevented, among other things, double deductions when the 
parent’s loss on its sale of stock occurred before the 
subsidiary recognized its loss.  See Consolidated Return 
Regulations; Special Rules Relating to Dispositions and 
Deconsolidations of Subsidiary Stock, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426-01, 
9427 (Mar. 14, 1990).  In July 2001, however, the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Rite-Aid v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357 
(Fed. Cir. 2001), invalidated the pertinent portion of 
§ 1.1502-20 as beyond the IRS’s power to issue because it 
addressed a problem not specifically attributable to the filing 
of consolidated returns.  Id. at 1360.  Though Rite-Aid has not 
been construed to annul any other consolidated return 
regulation preventing duplicated loss, invalidating § 1.1502-
20 meant that in its immediate aftermath there was no 
regulation expressly preventing a double deduction when the 
parent’s stock loss occurred before the subsidiary’s asset loss.  
In contrast, Rite-Aid left intact the regulatory prohibition on 
double deductions where the transactions are structured in 
such a way that the losses occur in reverse order, i.e., the 
subsidiary’s loss is recognized before the parent’s loss.  See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32. 
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 In the aftermath of Rite-Aid, the Duquesne group 
arranged a series of transactions in which DLH incurred a 
loss on AquaSource stock, and then AquaSource incurred 
losses on the sale of its assets (which were stock interests that 
AquaSource held directly and indirectly in eight of its own 
subsidiaries).  DLH formed AquaSource in the late 1990s as a 
wholly owned subsidiary to expand into the water utility 
business.  It funded AquaSource through a series of 
contributions in return for AquaSource stock.  Through 
February 2001, DLH contributed approximately $223 million 
in return for 50,000 shares of AquaSource stock.  Though 
DLH contributed a similar amount to AquaSource in the years 
thereafter, it increased its holdings to 1.2 million shares of 
AquaSource stock.  AquaSource used these contributions to 
purchase more than 50 water utility companies, which 
became both its subsidiaries and its assets.  It began to lose 
money, however, and in 2000 the Duquesne group decided to 
explore the sale of AquaSource’s assets. 
 The transactions before us began on December 31, 
2001, just before the deadline would expire for the IRS to file 
a petition for certiorari in Rite-Aid.  DLH transferred 50,000 
shares of AquaSource stock to Lehman Brothers, which 
Lehman valued at $4 million, as payment for Lehman’s 
services rendered to AquaSource.  DLH determined that these 
particular 50,000 shares of stock were the shares that it had 
possessed prior to February 2001 and thus accounted for $223 
million of its investment.  After various adjustments, DLH 
claimed a capital loss of $199 million on the transfer of stock 
to Lehman Brothers (the “2001 loss”).  On its 2001 tax return, 
the Duquesne group carried back $161 million of that loss to 
tax year 2000 and claimed a tentative refund of $35 million. 
 Shortly thereafter, the IRS announced the regulatory 
response to Rite-Aid.  It declined to litigate further the validity 
of Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20 and instead announced that it 
Case: 14-1743     Document: 003112662649     Page: 6      Date Filed: 06/29/2017
7 
 
would issue new regulations governing stock losses.  I.R.S. 
Notice 2002-11, 2002-1 C.B. 526 (Jan. 31, 2002).  It did so in 
early March 2002 by issuing temporary regulations that 
included Treas. Reg. § 1.337(d)-2T, which applied to stock 
losses occurring on or after March 7, 2002.  See Loss 
Limitation Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 11034-01, 11036-37 (Mar. 12, 
2002).2  Though these regulations “[did] not disallow [a] 
stock loss that reflects . . . built-in asset losses of a subsidiary 
member,” I.R.S. Notice 2002-18, 2002-1 C.B. 644 (Mar. 9, 
2002), the IRS published as guidance a draft of a new 
regulation barring double deductions in October 2002.  See 
Guidance Under Section 1502; Suspension of Losses on 
Certain Stock Dispositions, 67 Fed. Reg. 65060-01 (Oct. 23, 
2002).  The new regulation was issued in final form as Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1502-35T and applied retroactively to stock sales 
occurring on or after March 7, 2002. 
 In this complex and shifting regulatory environment, 
the Duquesne group thereafter incurred further losses on the 
sale by AquaSource of its assets.3  It did so through a series of 
                                                          
 2 The IRS also issued Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20T, which 
applied retroactively to stock losses occurring between the 
date of the Rite-Aid decision and March 7, 2002.  See Loss 
Limitation Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 11034-01, 11037 (Mar. 12, 
2002). 
 
 3 At oral argument before a prior appellate panel, 
Duquesne’s counsel represented that AquaSource had 
different subsidiaries in 2001 versus 2002-2003 in support of 
its claim that the case should be remanded for further 
development of the factual record.  Oral Arg. Trans. at 18 
(Nov. 18, 2015).  When opposing counsel pointed out that the 
record demonstrated that AquaSource’s subsidiaries had in 
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transactions after March 2002 and continuing into 2003 in 
which AquaSource sold all of its stock in eight subsidiaries, 
and thus the resulting losses were also stock losses.4  In 2002, 
these transactions resulted in capital losses for AquaSource 
totaling $59.5 million (the “2002 loss”), all of which the 
Duquesne group carried back to tax year 2000 on its 
consolidated return.  Based on the 2002 loss and additional 
carrybacks, the group received a tentative refund of $12 
million.  The sale transactions in 2003 yielded $192.8 million 
in capital losses for AquaSource after various adjustments 
(the “2003 loss”).  Duquesne carried all of the 2003 losses 
back to 2000 on its consolidated return and, based on that loss 
and additional carrybacks, received a tentative refund of $40 
million.  Aggregating the 2002-2003 losses, the Duquesne 
group deducted approximately $252 million in capital losses 
in addition to the $199 million it had already claimed for the 
2001 loss. 
 Though the IRS initially declined to challenge 
Duquesne’s deductions in a 2004 audit, it subsequently 
                                                                                                                                  
fact remained the same, see Oral Arg. Trans. at 26-27 (July 
12, 2016), Duquesne abandoned this claim. 
 
 4 That AquaSource incurred stock losses on the sale of 
its assets was the source of much terminological confusion in 
the litigation of this case.  As Duquesne did not make this 
clear in its individual briefing, and though the record 
remained unclear whether all of AquaSource’s losses were 
incurred on the sale of stock, the IRS acknowledged that at 
least 90% of the losses were stock losses.  IRS Supp. Br. at 4.  
As this issue is not ultimately relevant to our analysis, we 
accept Duquesne’s representation that all of AquaSource’s 
losses were stock losses for purposes of this appeal. 
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determined that the Duquesne group had claimed a double 
deduction; that is, the 2001 loss and the 2002-2003 losses 
reflected a single economic loss in the form of an underlying 
decline in the value of AquaSource’s subsidiaries.  Based on 
its calculations, the IRS concluded that $199 million of these 
losses were disallowed under the Ilfeld doctrine.5  Duquesne 
strongly disagreed, and as the parties were unable to resolve 
their dispute out of court, the IRS sent Duquesne a formal 
notice of deficiency in 2010. 
 Duquesne began proceedings in the Tax Court by 
filing a petition for relief.  Rather than following the normal 
pretrial procedure, the parties chose to forgo discovery and 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment focusing on 
whether the Ilfeld doctrine applied.  While these motions 
were pending, the Tax Court issued its decision in Thrifty Oil 
Co. v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. 198 (2012).  There the Court 
relied on Ilfeld to disallow certain duplicative losses that a 
consolidated taxpayer had claimed based on environmental 
remediation expenses.  As a result, the Tax Court allowed the 
parties to this case to file supplemental briefs addressing 
Thrifty Oil. 
 Thereafter the Tax Court granted the IRS’s motion for 
summary judgment and concluded that the Ilfeld doctrine 
remained good law in our Circuit.  Turning to the factual 
record, the Tax Court concluded that the IRS met its burden 
to show that the 2002-2003 losses duplicated the $199 million 
deduction taken in 2001, as they reflected the same economic 
loss.  It also rejected Duquesne’s argument that it satisfied the 
Ilfeld doctrine because its deductions were authorized under 
                                                          
 5 The IRS also asserted that a $228 million excess loss 
account should be triggered for tax year 2005, which would 
have been taxable as income for that year.  As this claim is no 
longer at issue, we need not decide it. 
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the applicable statutes and regulations as well as its further 
argument that the statute of limitations had, in any event, 
lapsed.  The Tax Court thus disallowed $199 million of the 
2002-2003 losses and ordered Duquesne to repay $36.9 
million of the refunds it had received based on those losses.  
This appeal followed. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 Did the Tax Court properly rely on the Ilfeld doctrine 
to disallow $199 million of the 2002-2003 losses?  Duquesne 
contends that the Court erred for three reasons: (1) the factual 
record was inadequate to support summary judgment; (2) the 
Ilfeld doctrine does not support disallowing the losses; and (3) 
the IRS’s claims are at least partially barred by the statute of 
limitations.  We consider each contention in turn. 
A. Adequacy of the Record 
 As the Ilfeld doctrine requires a clear declaration of 
intent to allow a double deduction for a single economic loss, 
its application is premised on a factual question: Did the 
deductions claimed by the taxpayer reflect the same economic 
loss?  See Thrifty Oil, 139 T.C. at 212; see also Denton & 
Anderson Co. v. Kavanagh, 164 F. Supp. 372, 378 (E.D. 
Mich. 1958).  Here the question is whether the 2001 loss and 
the 2002-2003 losses are truly duplicative—that is, did they 
both reflect the decline in value of the same AquaSource 
assets?  The Tax Court held that the IRS proved the absence 
of a genuine dispute of material fact on this point and that 
$199 million of the losses were deducted twice.  Though 
Duquesne contends that the IRS failed to submit sufficient 
evidence to show the existence of a double deduction or its 
amount, we disagree in light of Duquesne’s failure to present 
any evidence to the contrary despite having all of the relevant 
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documents in its possession and the Supreme Court’s decision 
in McLaughlin v. Pacific Lumber Co., 293 U.S. 351 (1934). 
 We exercise plenary review over the Tax Court’s grant 
of summary judgment, Hartmann v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 638 F.3d 248, 249 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), and 
the summary judgment standard in Tax Court Rule 121 is 
identical to that contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56, see Rivera v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 89 T.C. 343, 
346 (1987).  The party moving for summary judgment bears 
the initial burden to show the absence of a genuine dispute of 
material fact,  see Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
323 (1986), and thus all that remains is to resolve legal issues.   
 Though the initial burden of the IRS may be heavy in 
some cases, it is far lighter when, as here, it seeks to collect 
unpaid taxes.  “It is well established that[,] as a general 
matter, the [IRS]'s determination of deficiency is presumed 
correct, and the taxpayer bears ‘the burden of proving it 
wrong.’”  Cebollero v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 967 F.2d 
986, 990 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 
U.S. 111, 115 (1933)).  “This presumption is a procedural 
device that places the burden of producing evidence to rebut 
the presumption on the taxpayer.”  Anastasio v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 794 F.2d 884, 886 (3d Cir. 1986).  This is 
so because “an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative 
grace and . . . the burden of clearly showing the right to the 
claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.”  INDOPCO, Inc. v. 
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992).  The 
IRS is thus essentially in the position of a defendant in a civil 
case who may meet its initial burden merely by pointing to 
the absence of evidence supporting essential elements of the 
non-moving party’s case.  See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; 
see also Cal-Farm Ins. Co. v. United States, 647 F. Supp. 
1083, 1086-87 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (collecting cases stating that 
the presumption alone is sufficient to support summary 
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judgment when the taxpayer fails to rebut it); Mitchell v. 
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 854 (T.C. 
1979) (describing the IRS’s deficiency determination as 
“prima facie correct” and concluding that it must be sustained 
where “[the taxpayers] have presented no evidence to show 
that they are entitled to additional deductions”) (citing Tax 
Ct. R. 142(a)).   
 Duquesne now challenges the adequacy of the record 
before the Tax Court, yet it made numerous tactical decisions 
to limit that record.  While conceding that it has possession of 
the records necessary to determine whether its deductions 
reflect the same economic loss, Oral Arg. Trans. at 19-20 
(Nov. 18, 2015), it nonetheless agreed to limit the scope of 
discovery before summary judgment in order to conserve 
resources.  Duq. Br. at 43.  It then filed a motion for summary 
judgment raising “only legal issues,” notably whether the 
Ilfeld doctrine applied.  Id. at 37 n.10. 
 The IRS responded with a cross-motion for summary 
judgment.  It pointed to evidence initially filed in an exhibit 
to Duquesne’s motion regarding the size and timing of the 
deductions.  While Duquesne challenged the method the IRS 
used to calculate the amount of duplicated losses, it did not 
present any evidence rebutting the latter’s claim of a double 
deduction and merely promised that “[it] w[ould] challenge at 
trial the [IRS’s] erroneous determination of the amount of 
purported duplicated losses.”  J.A. at 670.  After allowing the 
parties to submit supplemental briefs on the effect of the 
Thrifty Oil decision, the Tax Court held that the IRS had 
pointed to sufficient evidence of duplicate losses; hence 
Duquesne’s “bald assertions” of a factual dispute were too 
little to merit a trial. Id. at 45.  
 Duquesne claims that the Tax Court applied an 
“irrebuttable presumption” based on Thrifty Oil that the 
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deductions were duplicative.  Reply Br. at 18.  While we may 
affirm on any basis supported by the record, it is worth noting 
that this argument misrepresents the Court’s reasoning.  
Though it stated that Duquesne’s deductions “represent the 
same economic loss[es],” J.A. at 42, borrowing this turn of 
phrase from Thrifty Oil was not invoking an irrebuttable 
presumption.  Nor did its conclusion that Thrifty Oil was 
consistent with Third Circuit precedent become a 
presumption that barred rebuttal.  Instead, the Tax Court 
determined that the IRS had met its burden based on the 
evidence in the record, including the size and timing of the 
deductions at issue.  There is thus nothing irrebuttable in the 
Court’s analysis; it concluded that Duquesne simply failed to 
rebut the IRS’s claims as required by ordinary summary 
judgment practice. 
 Though Duquesne contends that it was not required to 
present any evidence because the IRS’s case contained 
“unexplained gaps,” Reply Br. at 15 (quoting O’Donnell v. 
United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d Cir. 1989)), we agree 
with the Tax Court that the IRS demonstrated the absence of a 
genuine dispute of material fact.  As noted, it could have met 
its burden here merely by pointing to the absence of evidence 
supporting Duquesne’s position that the losses were not 
duplicative.   
 The Supreme Court’s 1934 decision in McLaughlin 
also supports the IRS.  There a subsidiary between 1920 and 
1923 had claimed operating losses three times greater than the 
capital invested in it by the parent, and the parent had 
attempted to claim further investment losses when it 
liquidated the subsidiary.  The Court reasoned that “the 
circumstances tend strongly to indicate” that the losses had a 
common source in the failing business of the subsidiary.  Id. 
at 357.  In addition, as “[p]resumably [the taxpayer] had 
within its control the records showing facts that would fully 
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disclose the relations between such losses,” if they were not 
duplicative “it reasonably may be presumed that [the 
taxpayer] would have shown that fact.”  Id. at 356-57.  The 
Court thus upheld the determination of the IRS that the 
parent’s losses should be disallowed. 
 Here the IRS’s evidence regarding the size and timing 
of the losses similarly reveals that Duquesne claimed losses 
significantly greater than its net investment in AquaSource.  
Aggregating the 2001 loss and the 2002-2003 losses as 
provided on AquaSource’s Stock Sales Adjustment 
calculation sheet, J.A. at 744, the IRS determined the 
Duquesne group deducted far more in aggregate capital losses 
than its net investment in AquaSource, the difference being 
$281 million.  As in Pacific Lumber, the excess of losses over 
investment occurred over a few years before the subsidiary 
ceased operation. This “tend[s] strongly to indicate” a double 
deduction stemming from the declining value of 
AquaSource’s assets.  Id. at 357.  Because Duquesne has 
possession of the relevant documents, we presume that it 
would have demonstrated that the losses came from different 
sources if that were the case.6  See id. at 356-57.  Though it 
                                                          
 6 Our decision in Nat’l State Bank v. Federal Reserve 
Bank of N.Y., 979 F.2d 1579 (3d Cir. 1992), is not to the 
contrary.  There National State Bank (“NSB”) bore the 
burden of proof as plaintiff to show that the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York had negligently handled certain checks 
that were part of a check-kiting scheme.  The District Court 
granted summary judgment because the Federal Reserve had 
taken too long to inform NSB that it had lost the checks in 
dispute.  We reversed, as there was no evidence on when the 
checks were lost or by whom and the Federal Reserve likely 
had the relevant records.  This is not our case; Duquesne had 
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attempts to distinguish Pacific Lumber on the grounds that it 
was not decided at summary judgment and involved a less 
complex set of corporate relationships, that is off target in 
light of the low burden the IRS faced here. 
 The IRS also met its burden to show the amount of 
duplicative losses.  As the aggregate excess of deducted 
losses over net investment implies a double deduction, the 
IRS compared the amount of excess to each deduction.  That 
excess was greater than the deduction claimed for the 2001 
stock loss ($199 million), and thus the IRS concluded that at 
least the amount of the 2001 stock loss was deducted twice.  
This calculation of $199 million in duplicated loss thus 
abandoned any IRS claim in addition to that loss (and, as in 
Pacific Lumber, it reflected the parent’s claimed loss in the 
transaction).  Duquesne cites no case in which greater proof 
was required, nor does it present any evidence that the $199 
million figure is inaccurate.7  We thus see no unexplained 
                                                                                                                                  
the relevant records and did not produce documents to 
counter the IRS’s allegations of duplicate losses. 
 
 7 In its brief to the Tax Court, Duquesne suggested that 
the IRS should have used a different valuation for the 
AquaSource subsidiaries as of December 31, 2001, which 
Duquesne asserted would have yielded a different amount of 
duplicated loss.  J.A. at 660.  This argument is waived, as 
Duquesne failed to raise it in its opening brief on appeal.  See 
United States v. Hoeffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 162 (3d Cir. 
2008).  Moreover, the issue is not material, as the amount of 
the 2002-2003 losses must be determined by comparing 
AquaSource’s adjusted basis in its subsidiaries’ stock to the 
sale price.  See 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a).  If this calculation uses 
Duquesne’s preferred valuation, it does not reduce the amount 
of duplicated loss.  See IRS Br. at 28 n.5. 
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gaps in the IRS’s case that renders summary judgment in its 
favor improper. 
 Duquesne nonetheless contends that the IRS had to 
“trace” the losses between Duquesne’s sale of AquaSource 
stock and the losses incurred on the sale of particular 
AquaSource assets (that is, the sale of particular AquaSource 
subsidiaries).  Tracing is necessary, Duquesne asserts, to rule 
out the possibility that unspecified intervening event(s) 
somehow account for a portion of the 2002-2003 asset losses.  
But because Duquesne fails to present evidence of any such 
events or of any other effect that tracing would have on the 
amount of duplicated loss, this is merely the kind of 
speculation that does not defeat summary judgment.8  
 In the alternative, Duquesne contends that the District 
Court abused its discretion by failing to order further 
discovery before deciding the IRS’s summary judgment 
motion. Like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), Tax 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 8 To the extent Duquesne contends that tracing is still 
required as a matter of law, we reject it as unsupported by any 
authority.  Though it relies on Edward Katzinger Co. v. 
Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 533 (1941), aff’d, 129 F.2d 74 (7th 
Cir. 1942), that case held it was the taxpayer who failed to 
show that its deductions reflected different losses.  See id. at 
76.  The IRS’s 2007 comments on a proposal to prevent 
double deductions by disallowing asset losses are also of 
little-to-no use.  See Unified Rule for Loss on Subsidiary 
Stock, 72 Fed. Reg. 2964-01, 2976 (Jan. 23, 2007).  While the 
IRS rejected a proposal that would “present considerable 
tracing issues,” id., it was never adopted and hence is 
irrelevant to its burden at summary judgment.  
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Court Rule 121(e) confers discretion on the trial court to 
order further discovery when the non-moving party files a 
motion or affidavit stating that more discovery is needed for it 
to justify its opposition to summary judgment.  Duquesne, 
however, never claimed that it could not justify its opposition 
without further discovery, and thus it cannot claim the 
protection of Rule 121(e). 
 Despite its failure to comply with the Rule, Duquesne 
contends that our decision in Sames v. Gable, 732 F.2d 49 (3d 
Cir. 1984), required the Tax Court to order further discovery 
anyway.  There two former police officers filed a civil rights 
claim against local police officials for retaliatory discharge.  
While their interrogatory requests were pending, the 
defendants moved for summary judgment and the plaintiffs 
failed to request further discovery under Rule 56(d) (then 
codified as Rule 56(f)).  Relying on the well-settled rule that 
summary judgment should not be granted while the material 
facts remain in the moving party’s possession, we held “that it 
was error for the district court to grant defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment while pertinent discovery requests were 
outstanding” despite the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the 
Federal Rules.  Id. at 51-52.  Here, however, Duquesne had 
possession of the relevant facts and chose to limit discovery 
for reasons only it knows.  In sum, it gambled that its legal 
arguments were strong enough to win without creating the 
factual record necessary to rebut the IRS’s position. After that 
gamble failed, Sames did not require the District Court to 
delay summary judgment.   
 We thus conclude that the Tax Court properly held that 
$199 million of the 2001 loss and 2002-2003 losses were 
deducted for the same underlying economic loss.  After 
determining that there was no genuine dispute that $199 
million in deducted losses for 2002-2003 were duplicative, 
the Tax Court disallowed that amount of those losses under 
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the Ilfeld doctrine.9  We thus turn to Duquesne’s next 
contention: that although its consolidated deductions may be 
duplicative, the Ilfeld doctrine nonetheless does not support 
the Tax Court’s decision to disallow them. 
B. The Ilfeld Doctrine 
 Ilfeld requires a clear declaration allowing double 
deductions for the same loss on consolidated returns.  
Duquesne contends that the text of 26 U.S.C. § 165 provides 
the required authority to satisfy Ilfeld; if § 165 alone proves 
insufficient, the combination of it with the applicable 
regulations in effect provides clear authority; and in any event 
the regulations alone—particularly §1.337(d)-2T—suffice.  In 
evaluating these arguments we review anew the Tax Court’s 
legal conclusions.  See Anderson v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 698 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2012). 
1. The Current Status of the Ilfeld Doctrine 
 Duquesne does not dispute that Ilfeld remains good 
law.  While there is dispute as to the scope of the Ilfeld 
doctrine — that is, whether it applies outside the consolidated 
return context — for consolidated taxpayers it continues to 
require that a statute and/or regulation specifically authorize a 
double deduction for an underlying economic loss. 
                                                          
 9 Duquesne also argues that the Tax Court erred in 
how it allocated the $199 million in disallowed loss between 
the 2002 loss and the 2003 loss.  The Tax Court allocated $59 
million to the 2002 loss and the remaining $140 million to the 
2003 loss.  J.A. at 48-49.  This allocation was proposed by 
Duquesne, however, and agreed to by the IRS.  Id. at 47-48.  
Moreover, as we reject below the statute-of-limitations 
argument made by Duquesne, the allocation of losses between 
2002 and 2003 is irrelevant. 
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 Ilfeld, decided in 1934, concerned consolidated tax 
returns filed by Charles Ilfeld Co. and two wholly owned 
subsidiaries between 1917 and 1929.  During this period, the 
subsidiaries claimed substantial operating losses and were 
eventually liquidated.  Ilfeld Co. then attempted to deduct 
losses on its investment in the defunct subsidiaries.  Though 
these investment losses could not be deducted under the 
regulations in effect at the time, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that, because the investment losses were already 
reflected in the subsidiaries’ operating losses, allowing them 
“would be the practical equivalent of a double deduction.”  
Ilfeld, 292 U.S. at 68.  Thus, “[i]n the absence of a provision 
of the [applicable statute] definitely requiring it, a purpose so 
opposed to precedent and equality of treatment of taxpayers 
will not be attributed to lawmakers.”  Id.  “[D]efinitely 
requiring” a provision to authorize a double deduction for the 
same economic loss is a very high hurdle, though how high is 
debatable when Ilfeld itself stated that “[i]n the absence of a 
provision in the [applicable act] or regulation that fairly may 
be read to authorize [a double deduction], the deduction 
claimed is not allowed.”  Id. at 66.   
 How to interpret this disparity in the degree of 
certainty was taken care of when the Supreme Court restated 
Ilfeld as requiring a “clear declaration of intent by Congress” 
to authorize a double deduction in Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. at 
684 (citing United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927)).  
Though a declaration by Congress is stated, we do not purport 
to rule out clear statements of intent set out in regulations the 
IRS Commissioner is empowered to prescribe.  See Ilfeld, 292 
U.S. at 68.  Indeed, Ilfeld itself noted that because “[t]here 
[was] nothing in the [Revenue Act of 1928] that purport[ed] 
to authorize double deduction of losses or in the regulations 
to suggest that the commissioner construed any of its 
provisions to empower him to prescribe a regulation that 
would permit consolidated returns to be made on the basis 
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now claimed by [Ilfeld Co.],” it could not deduct its 
duplicative investment losses.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 Ilfeld quickly became a key precedent in the 
consolidated return context.  In Pacific Lumber the Supreme 
Court relied on Ilfeld for the principle that “[l]osses of [the 
subsidiary] that were subtracted from [the group’s] income 
are not directly or indirectly again deductible.”  293 U.S. at 
355.  Our Court similarly relied on Ilfeld to disallow 
deductions for consolidated returns.  See Grief Cooperage 
Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 85 F.2d 365, 366 (3d 
Cir. 1936); see also Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. National 
Casket Co., 78 F.2d 940, 941-42 (3d Cir. 1935).   
 Some of our sister Circuits have extended the Ilfeld 
doctrine beyond the consolidated-return context — see, e.g., 
Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 114 
F.2d 882, 887 (7th Cir. 1940) (appropriate method of 
depreciation for railroad property); Comar Oil Co. v. 
Helvering, 107 F.2d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 1939) (deductibility of 
anticipated inventory losses); Marwais Steel Co. v. Comm’r 
of Internal Revenue, 354 F.2d 997, 997-99 & n.1 (9th Cir. 
1965) (investment losses among corporate taxpayers filing 
separate returns).   
 All of the cases questioning the continued viability of 
Ilfeld have occurred outside the consolidated-return context.  
For example, in a case in our Circuit—Miller’s Estate v. 
Commissioner, 400 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1968)—the IRS argued 
that certain deductions flowing from estates’ donations to 
charitable trusts were double deductions.  We distinguished 
Ilfeld on the ground that it concerned “the peculiar income tax 
context of consolidated corporate income tax reporting,” and 
thus it “cannot be regarded as a legitimate canon of estate tax 
interpretation to assist the court in this case.”  Id. at 411 
(internal footnotes omitted).   
Case: 14-1743     Document: 003112662649     Page: 20      Date Filed: 06/29/2017
21 
 
 The Supreme Court indicated that Ilfeld might apply 
beyond consolidated returns the year following Estate of 
Miller in Skelly Oil, where it required a non-consolidated 
taxpayer to recalculate certain refunds based on oil and gas 
revenues.  394 U.S. at 684.  But decades later the Court in 
Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001), may have 
implied that Ilfeld does not apply other than for consolidated 
returns.  Addressing an argument abandoned by the IRS—
that, if shareholders of an S corporation (in which income is 
passed through to shareholders and then taxed as personal 
income) were permitted to pass through a discharge of 
indebtedness before reducing tax attributes, the shareholders 
may have gotten a “double windfall” by being partially 
exempted from taxation yet able to increase their basis and 
deduct previously suspended losses—the Court elected not to 
address this “policy concern.”  Id. at 219-20.  Though Justice 
Breyer’s dissent criticized the majority for failing to apply 
Ilfeld, see id. at 224, the majority did not so much as mention 
that decision or Skelly Oil; it certainly did not purport to 
overrule them.  In any event, after Gitlitz the Ilfeld doctrine 
thus remains good law in the consolidated-return context.10  
                                                          
 10 In its supplemental briefing, Duquesne also points to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in United Dominion Industries, 
Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822 (2001), as an indication of 
Ilfeld’s diminished role.  Though United Dominion is a 
consolidated-return case in which the Court declined to rule 
in the IRS’s favor with respect to its double-deduction 
argument, it does not apply here because the calculation at 
issue “[was] not in and of itself the basis for any tax event.”  
Id. at 834.  What this means is that the Court rejected the 
analogy to Ilfeld because there was no loss deduction at issue. 
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 With this in mind, we proceed to what is currently 
required for a statute to satisfy the Ilfeld doctrine.  It reflects 
“[t]he presumption … that statutes and regulations do not 
allow a double deduction” for the same economic loss.  
United Telecomm. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 589 F.2d 
1383, 1387-88 (10th Cir. 1978).  This presumption must be 
overcome by a clear declaration in statutory text or a properly 
authorized regulation.   
2. Deduction of the 2002-2003 Losses Under § 165 
 Duquesne argues that a specific authorization for 
duplication of loss here may be found in the text of § 165.  In 
particular, it points to subsections (a) and (f) of that provision.  
As these subsections “provide[] for deduction of losses, 
including capital losses,” and the 2002-2003 losses were 
incurred on AquaSource’s sale of stock in its subsidiaries, 
Duquesne contends that the “deductions fall squarely within 
§ 165’s text” even if they are duplicative.  Duq. Br. at 15.  We 
conclude otherwise. 
 The general rule of § 165(a) is that “[t]here shall be 
allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable 
year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.”  26 
U.S.C. § 165(a).  That the subsection allows “a deduction” 
for “any loss” indicates that it allows a single deduction for a 
single loss.  Id. (emphases added).  The brief text of the 
subsection certainly contains no express authorization of a 
double deduction, and we are unaware of any evidence of 
congressional intent to that effect.  Moreover, as the Tax 
Court noted, § 165(a) is quite broad in authorizing a 
deduction for any loss and is thus a poor candidate to satisfy 
the Ilfeld requirement of explicit approval for duplicating the 
underlying economic loss.  See J.A. at 46-47. 
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 Section 165(f)’s limitation on the deductibility of 
capital losses also does not support Duquesne’s position.  It 
provides that “[l]osses from sales or exchanges of capital 
assets shall be allowed only to the extent allowed in sections 
1211 and 1212.”  26 U.S.C. § 165(f).  26 U.S.C. § 1211(a) 
provides that corporations may deduct capital losses only to 
offset capital gains from the sale of different assets, and 
section 1212(a)(1)(A) allows corporations to carry back 
capital losses up to three years.  These limitations are 
irrelevant to the prospect of a double deduction for the same 
economic loss, and in any event they are not at issue here.   
 Beyond the plain text of the statute, Ilfeld’s case-
specific holding sends a particularly strong signal that § 165 
does not authorize a double deduction.  At the time Ilfeld was 
decided, the Revenue Act of 1928 was in effect and contained 
a provision indistinguishable from the current § 165(a): “In 
computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: 
… In the case of a corporation, losses sustained during the 
taxable year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise.”  
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 23(f), 45 Stat. 791, 799-800.  
The IRS brought this provision to the Court’s attention and 
specifically argued that it did not allow Ilfeld Co. to claim a 
double deduction.  See Brief for Respondent at 22, Charles 
Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 68 (No. 579), 1933 WL 
63349 at *22.  To uphold that assertion, Ilfeld had to reject 
any assertion that this provision demonstrated a clear intent to 
allow it. 
 While Duquesne contends that any consideration of the 
Revenue Act by the Supreme Court was a mere dictum 
because it had already determined that the taxpayer’s 
deductions were barred by applicable regulations, this 
contention runs into Pacific Lumber, which also interpreted 
virtually identical statutory text.  As no applicable regulations 
governed the specific deductions, the Court determined 
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whether they were allowed under the applicable statute, the 
Revenue Act of 1921.  That Act contained the following 
provision: “[For purposes of the corporate income tax], there 
shall be allowed as deductions: … Losses sustained during 
the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or 
otherwise …”  Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 234(a)(4), 42 
Stat. 227, 254-55.  The IRS also brought this provision to the 
Court’s attention in arguing that it did not authorize a double 
deduction.  See Brief for Petitioner at 20, McLaughlin v. 
Pacific Lumber Co., 293 U.S. 351 (No. 125), 1934 WL 60331 
at *20.  The bottom line: to hold that the taxpayer’s losses 
were not deductible a second time, Pacific Lumber rejected a 
provision materially identical to § 165(a) without any help 
from the consolidated return regulations.  Ilfeld and Pacific 
Lumber’s rejection of such a strikingly similar predecessor to 
§ 165 as a rationale for a double deduction thus provides 
further support for our conclusion that the current statute does 
not provide that rationale.   
 We thus turn to Duquesne’s next argument: that even 
if § 165 alone does not satisfy Ilfeld’s requirement of a clear 
statement of intent to authorize a double deduction, the 
combination of that provision with the applicable regulations 
in effect does so. 
3. Deduction of the 2002-2003 Losses Under § 165 and 
Applicable Regulations 
 Duquesne asserts that it complied with all applicable 
regulations in calculating AquaSource’s losses and then 
deducted them under § 165.  In particular, it calculated the 
amount that AquaSource lost on sales of its subsidiaries’ 
stock per the regulations governing stock losses, primarily 
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-32 and 1.337(d)-2T, before deducting 
those losses under § 165.  As Duquesne thus purports to have 
complied with the requirements of both on-point regulations 
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and an on-point statute, it contends that the Tax Court’s 
decision in Woods Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 
274 (1985), teaches that Ilfeld’s clear statement rule is 
satisfied and we should rule in its favor by applying the 
regulations and the Code “as written.”  Id. at 282.   
 In light of the complexity of the regulatory framework, 
Duquesne’s argument requires some unpacking.  The first 
step in determining the amount of the 2002-2003 losses was 
calculating AquaSource’s basis in the stock of its subsidiaries.  
Under 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a), the amount of loss for tax 
purposes on the sale of an asset, including stock, is equal to 
the taxpayer’s basis minus the sale price.  For stock sales by 
consolidated taxpayers, such as AquaSource, Tax Regulation 
§ 1.1502-32 requires the parent to adjust its basis to reflect 
various events at the subsidiary, including gains and losses.  It 
is undisputed that the Duquesne group made all the 
adjustments required by § 1.1502-32 to AquaSource’s basis in 
its subsidiaries’ stock and calculated the amount of loss for 
tax purposes accordingly. 
 The Duquesne group then calculated the amount of 
allowable loss on AquaSource’s stock sales per § 1.337(d)-
2T.  Paragraph (a)(1) of the regulation provides the general 
rule that “[n]o deduction is allowed for any loss recognized 
by a member of a consolidated group with respect to the 
disposition of stock of a subsidiary.”  Paragraph (c)(2), 
governing “[a]llowable [l]oss,” then gives a partial exception 
to this general rule: “Loss is not disallowed under paragraph 
(a)(1) of this section … to the extent the taxpayer establishes 
that the loss … is not attributable to the recognition of built-in 
gain on the disposition of an asset (including stock and 
securities).”  Treas. Reg. § 1.337(d)-2T(c)(2).  A built-in gain 
occurs when an asset increases in value before being sold.  As 
AquaSource’s subsidiaries had declined in value, none of the 
2002-2003 losses reflected built-in gains.   
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 With this backdrop to Duquesne’s contention of 
statutory/regulatory compliance in conjunction with its 
reading of Woods, the Government asserts that Woods does 
not control, as here no statute or regulation permitted a double 
deduction with anything approaching the specificity that 
compelled the outcome in that case.  In Woods the issue was 
whether the Ilfeld doctrine applied to the calculation of a 
parent’s basis in its subsidiary’s stock.  At the time 
Regulation § 1.1502-32 required the parent to adjust its basis 
in line with the subsidiary’s earnings and profits, and 26 
U.S.C. § 312(k) required the parent to calculate those 
earnings and profits using a straight-line method of 
depreciation.  Despite its awareness of the potential for 
straight-line depreciation to result in the practical equivalent 
of a double deduction, the IRS had failed to amend § 1.1502-
32 for almost twenty years.  The Tax Court reasoned that the 
details of the consolidated return regime were “essentially a 
legislative and administrative matter,” and thus it was not a 
court’s institutional role to engage in “judicial interference.”  
Woods, 85 T.C. at 282.  It thus held that it would “apply [the 
consolidated return] regulations and the statute as written”: if 
the IRS disliked this result, it “should use [its] broad power to 
amend [its] regulations.”  Id.  Ilfeld did not support the IRS’s 
position because “the detailed rules in [§ 1.1502-32], which 
were enacted to comprehensively address the problem in 
[Ilfeld], together with section 312(k), can fairly be read to 
authorize the result herein . . . .”  Id. at 283 (internal footnote 
omitted).  Woods thus teaches that when an on-point statute 
and an on-point regulation authorize the taxpayer to act as it 
did, courts should apply the statute and regulation as written. 
 The Tax Court clarified in Wyman-Gordon Co. v. 
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 207 (1987), that Woods may not apply 
in the absence of a statute and/or regulation clearly 
authorizing the disputed deductions.  At issue was whether 
Code § 312(1) and Regulation § 1.1502-32 authorized the 
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taxpayer to include discharge of indebtedness income in the 
calculation of its subsidiaries’ earnings and profits.  The 
Court distinguished Woods on the ground that the latter’s 
holding “was based in large part on § 312(k), which 
specifically require[d]” the taxpayer to compute its basis as it 
had, whereas “there exist[ed] no comparable statutory 
provision that require[d] inclusion of discharge of 
indebtedness income in earnings and profits.”  Id. at 219.  As 
no specific provision of any regulation, including § 1.1502-
32, supported the taxpayer’s position, the Court disallowed 
the deductions as an impermissible duplication of loss.  Id. at 
224.  Though there was thus no on-point regulation at issue in 
Wyman-Gordon, it nonetheless indicates that Woods’ 
instruction to apply the Code and regulations as written 
requires a statute and/or regulation affirmatively permitting 
the taxpayer to act as it did.11 
 Section 165, however, did not specifically authorize 
Duquesne to claim a duplicative deduction of the 2002-2003 
losses.  As discussed above, its subsection (a) broadly allows 
a single deduction for any loss, but it does not contemplate 
the possibility of a double deduction.  Moreover, as a 
materially identical statute was at issue in Ilfeld and Pacific 
Lumber, those decisions send a particularly strong signal that 
                                                          
 11 The Tax Court’s decision in CSI Hydrostatic 
Testers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 398 (1994), is not to 
the contrary.  In that case, the Court applied Woods when 
legislative history indicated clearly that Congress intended the 
statute in dispute to require including relevant income in the 
calculation of its subsidiaries’ earnings and profits, and thus 
no more specific statement was needed for the taxpayer to 
adjust its basis under § 1.1502-32.  See id. at 405. 
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§ 165 does not authorize a double deduction.  Thus it is out of 
play for coupling it to potentially applicable regulations.    
4. Deduction of the 2002-2003 Losses Under Solely the 
Regulations 
 Duquesne counters that, even absent § 165, its 
regulatory compliance with §§ 1.1502-32 and 1.337(d)-2T 
alone was sufficient to overcome any effect of Ilfeld.12  Yet 
we are not persuaded that these regulations are sufficiently 
clear to preclude application of the Ilfeld doctrine.  At the 
outset, § 1.1502-32 does not support Duquesne’s position 
because its basis adjustments address the prospect of a 
duplicated loss in a transaction where the subsidiary 
recognizes its loss before the parent engages in a stock sale.  
Consolidated Return Regulations; Special Rules Relating to 
Dispositions and Deconsolidations of Subsidiary Stock, 55 
Fed. Reg. 9426-01, 9427 (Mar. 14, 1990).  Where, as here, 
the parent’s stock sale occurs first, the prospect of a double 
                                                          
 12 Duquesne also posits that Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-80(a) 
precludes application of the Ilfeld doctrine because it requires 
separate treatment of parent and subsidiary in the absence of a 
consolidated return regulation to the contrary.  Though the 
Tax Court once interpreted the regulation in this manner 
without reasoned analysis, see Gottesman & Co., Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1149, 1156 (1981), this interpretation 
finds no support in its text.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-80(a) 
(as amended March 2003) (“The Internal Revenue Code, or 
other law, shall be applicable to the group to the extent the 
regulations do not exclude its application”).  We therefore 
reject it and simply look to other law, including the Ilfeld 
doctrine, to determine the proper treatment of stock losses for 
entity groups filing consolidated returns. 
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deduction has been addressed by other regulations since § 
1.1502-20 was issued in the early 1990s.  Id. 
 We thus turn to the other regulation on which 
Duquesne relies, § 1.337(d)-2T.  As noted above, subsection 
(a)(1) generally forbids any deduction for losses incurred on 
sales of subsidiary stock, and subsection (c)(2) provides that 
“[l]oss is not disallowed under paragraph (a)(1) . . . to the 
extent the taxpayer establishes that the loss . . . is not 
attributable to the recognition of built-in gain on the 
disposition of an asset (including stock and securities).”  
From this double negative (“not disallowed”) on a negative 
(“not attributable”), Duquesne asks us to infer that any stock 
losses not reflecting a built-in gain, including duplicative 
losses, are deductible. 
 We do not believe that the structure and purpose of the 
broader regulatory regime support Duquesne’s interpretation 
of § 1.337(d)-2T.  Consolidated taxpayers pay based on the 
consolidated taxable income (CTI) of the group.  United 
Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 826 
(2001).  CTI is calculated by combining the separate taxable 
income (STI) of each member of the group and then 
incorporating certain adjustments calculated on a 
consolidated basis.  Id.  Adjustments on a consolidated basis 
are an example of the consolidated return regime adopting the 
“single entity” approach to prevent distortion of tax liability.  
See American Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 
261-62 (Ct. Cl. 1979).  This treats the entire consolidated 
group as a single taxpayer and “reduce[s] the significance of 
each member’s separate existence.”  Don Leatherman, Why 
Rite-Aid Is Wrong, 52 Am. L. Rev. 811, 815-16 (2003).  The 
Ilfeld doctrine also reflects a single-entity approach by 
preventing the group as a whole from claiming duplicative 
deductions that the separate existence of parent and 
Case: 14-1743     Document: 003112662649     Page: 29      Date Filed: 06/29/2017
30 
 
subsidiary would otherwise allow.  See Axelrod, supra, § 
18:2 (4th ed. 2015).    
 This structure for consolidated returns indicates the 
intent that the 2002-2003 losses be dealt with on a 
consolidated basis, and thus it reflects the same single-entity 
approach as the Ilfeld doctrine.  Section 1.1502-32, on which 
Duquesne relies, has the express purpose of treating the group 
as “a single entity.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(a)(1).  And 
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-11(a)(3) and 1.1502-22 provide that 
net capital gains and losses — that is, the overall amount of 
capital gains or losses in a particular year — are those items 
calculated on a consolidated basis.   
 The calculation of individual stock losses also occurs 
on a consolidated basis, see Treas. Reg. 1.1502-12(j), and for 
nearly thirty years these calculations have followed detailed 
rules designed to prevent tax evasion.  Before Rite-Aid, 
§ 1.1502-20 limited stock losses based on various loss 
disallowance factors.  See Corporations; Consolidated 
Returns—Special Rules Relating to Dispositions and 
Deconsolidations of Subsidiary Stock, 56 Fed. Reg. 47379-01, 
47379 (Sept. 19, 1991).  Those factors primarily disallowed 
stock losses reflecting a built-in gain in the subsidiary’s 
assets.  See Consolidated Return Regulations; Special Rules 
Relating to Dispositions and Deconsolidations of Subsidiary 
Stock, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426-01, 9427 (Mar. 14, 1990).  Though 
the sale of a capital asset with a built-in gain generally results 
in tax liability, see 26 U.S.C. § 1231, a formerly common 
type of transaction allowed consolidated taxpayers to arrange 
a stock loss to offset that gain and thereby avoid tax 
liability.13  Section 1.1502-20 also had the distinct purpose of 
                                                          
 13 In what was known as a “son of mirrors” 
transaction, a consolidated taxpayer would purchase a new 
subsidiary that had assets with built-in gains.  See 
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preventing double deductions, see Consolidated Return 
Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. at 9427, which was reflected in the 
duplicated loss factors.  Specifically, it prevented double 
deductions when, as here, the parent’s stock loss occurred 
before the subsidiary recognized a loss.  Id. 
 But because Rite-Aid invalidated § 1.1502-20, the IRS 
had to issue new regulations limiting stock losses.  In doing 
so, it separated the rules for stock losses occurring on and 
after March 7, 2002, primarily into two temporary 
regulations: §§ 1.337(d)-2T and 1.1502-35T.14  As noted, § 
1.337(d)-2T(c)(2)’s exception to the general ban on losses for 
subsidiary stock sales in consolidated tax regimes requires the 
taxpayer to prove that a loss is not the result of a built-in gain.  
 Though the IRS acknowledged that § 1.337(d)-2T 
“d[id] not disallow stock loss[es] that reflect[] . . . built-in 
asset losses of a subsidiary member,” it informed taxpayers 
that it “and Treasury believe that a consolidated group should 
not be able to benefit more than once from one economic 
loss” and would issue another regulation to prevent double 
deductions.  I.R.S. Notice 2002-18, 2002-1 C.B. 644 (Mar. 9, 
                                                                                                                                  
Leatherman, supra, at 846-47 & n.172.  It would then trigger 
a gain by transferring those assets to another member of the 
group, which increased the parent’s basis in the new 
subsidiary’s stock under § 1.1502-32.  Id.  But because the 
transfer of the assets also reduced the value of the new 
subsidiary’s stock, the parent could then sell its stock and 
claim a loss to offset the gain realized on the assets.  Id. 
 
 14 Though § 1.1502-35T was not issued in final form 
until 2003, it applied retroactively to stock sales starting on 
March 7, 2002 (with certain exceptions not relevant here).  
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-35T(j). 
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2002).  The IRS thus had the prospect of issuing another 
regulation to bar double deductions when it issued § 1.337(d)-
2T, and doing so was consistent with the consolidated return 
practice of imposing multiple restrictions on stock losses (as 
in the former § 1.1502-20).     
 Section 1.1502-35T was the pertinent regulation, and it 
was expressly intended “to prevent a group from obtaining 
more than one tax benefit from a single economic loss.”  
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-35T(a).  It accomplished this through a 
loss suspension rule: 
Any loss recognized by a member of a 
consolidated group with respect to the 
disposition of a share of subsidiary member 
stock shall be suspended to the extent of the 
duplicated loss with respect to such share of 
stock if, immediately after the disposition, the 
subsidiary is a member of the consolidated 
group of which it was a member immediately 
prior to the disposition (or any successor 
group). 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-35T(c)(1) (as issued in 2003 retroactive 
to March 7, 2002).  Yet this regulation failed to prevent a 
double deduction here because of how the Duquesne group 
structured the relevant transactions in the wake of Rite-Aid.  
The loss suspension rule of paragraph 1.1502-35T(c) applies 
only when a member of a consolidated group, such as 
AquaSource, sells stock in its subsidiaries and those 
subsidiaries remain members of the group after the sale.  But 
because AquaSource sold all of the stock in its subsidiaries to 
third parties, they were no longer members of the group after 
the 2002-2003 losses.  Paragraph 1.1502-35T(c) thus did not 
prevent AquaSource from deducting the 2002-2003 losses.  
Though Duquesne may nonetheless claim that it complied 
Case: 14-1743     Document: 003112662649     Page: 32      Date Filed: 06/29/2017
33 
 
with § 1.1502-35T in the sense that it did not violate it, we 
agree with the Tax Court that this is not enough to meet the 
clear authorization test of Ilfeld.  
 So this case comes down to whether, under the 
interpretive principle of Ilfeld, § 1.337(d)-2T clearly 
authorizes the losses in 2002-03 for the Duquesne 
consolidated group that duplicates the loss it took for 2001.  
Its argument is that, even if Ilfeld applies, while paragraph 
(a)(1) bars a deduction for any losses by any member of a 
consolidated group with respect to the disposition of stock by 
a subsidiary (here the sale by AquaSource of the entire 
interest in eight of its direct and indirect subsidiaries), 
paragraph (c)(2) does not disallow those losses if AquaSource 
shows that they do not result from built-in gain on that sale, 
and here they do not. 
 If literally applied to the exclusion of all other 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, Duquesne (and our 
dissenting colleague) make a strong argument.  By regulation 
there is excluded —that is, disallowed—any deduction for a 
loss that occurs when a member of a consolidated group sells 
stock in a subsidiary.  26 C.F.R. § 1.337(d)-2T(a)(1).  Yet that 
deduction disallowance “is not disallowed” under paragraph 
(c)(2) when the sale does not result in the recognition of built-
in gain (an assertion we accept here).   
 So is the case closed?  No.  That is because the partial 
excision in paragraph (c)(2) is one-time only, for there is no 
mention in the regulation of approval for a loss deduction that 
duplicates another already taken for the underlying economic 
loss.  We know that it has nothing to do with loss duplication 
because, at the same time paragraph (c)(2) was issued 
notwithstanding its exception to loss disallowance, the Notice 
accompanying it warned that the “IRS and Treasury believe 
that a consolidated group should not be able to benefit more 
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than once from one economic loss.”  IRS Notice 2002-18, 
2002-1 C.B. 644 (Mar. 9, 2002).  In this context, the 
blinkered approach of Duquesne does not stand so long as 
there is Ilfeld.  It remains a valid interpretative principle for 
consolidated returns until the Supreme Court tells us 
otherwise.15 
 We therefore confront circumstances fundamentally 
unlike those before the Tax Court in Woods.  This is not a 
case of the IRS failing to act when its own regulations and 
related statute specifically authorize the result sought by the 
taxpayer.  Here, unlike Woods, the IRS has never had a 
regulatory scheme in place that would authorize Duquesne to 
take both deductions it has claimed for the same economic 
loss.  And the text of § 1.337(d)-2T does not clearly allow in 
the future losses already taken on consolidated returns.  Put 
another way, future losses cannot be added to past losses 
already deducted for the same group of assets.  The dissent 
would have us apply Woods and hold that the IRS implicitly 
authorized Duquesne’s double deductions when they were not 
explicitly banned.  For consolidated-return taxpayers, implied 
authorizations are not enough; they must be clear statements 
                                                          
 15 What our dissenting colleague characterizes as our 
deference to the IRS’s “position regarding the status or 
strength of judicial precedent,” Dissent at 13, is no deference 
at all, but our independent assessment that possibly relevant 
regulations did not provide the required authorization under 
Ilfeld for Duquesne to take a double deduction.  Because we 
happen to agree with the IRS as to whether Ilfeld’s 
requirements were satisfied in this circumstance does not 
mean we defer in any way to its reading of judicial precedent.   
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that can fairly be read to allow double deductions for the 
same economic loss, and here that did not occur.16  
C. Statute of Limitations 
 Finally, Duquesne contends that the IRS is time-barred 
from ordering repayment of at least some of its tentative 
refunds resulting from the carryback of the 2002 and 2003 
losses to tax year 2000.  Though we agree with the Tax Court 
that it is difficult to understand what Duquesne is attempting 
to argue on this issue, its briefing on appeal enables us to 
discern the basic contours of the argument.  Duquesne asserts 
that, to the extent losses were carried back from 2002 to 2000 
                                                          
 16 Duquesne also makes the argument that even if its 
interpretation of the consolidated return regulations proved 
incorrect, it is still entitled to claim a double deduction 
because its interpretation of those regulations was reasonable.  
Though the Tax Court allowed a reasonableness defense in 
Gottesman, this was because the IRS sought to impose a 
penalty tax that is strictly construed against the IRS.  See 77 
T.C. at 1156.  Indeed, the Court repeated that its reasoning 
rested on the penalty tax at issue “for emphasis.”  Id.  
Duquesne is unable to cite any case in which reasonableness 
was allowed as a defense for non-payment of ordinary 
corporate taxes such as those before us today (despite its 
insistence that Applied Research Assocs., Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 143 T.C. 310 (2014), somehow implies this).   
 Though Duquesne also argues that Gottesman teaches 
courts not to fill gaps in the consolidated return regulations, 
Gottesman’s language to that effect is also off point.  See 77 
T.C. at 1158.  It concerned not only a penalty tax, but also, as 
in Woods, a situation in which the IRS had failed to amend its 
regulations despite having years to do so.  See id. 
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and it received tentative refunds for tax year 2000 as a result, 
26 U.S.C. § 6501(k) places those refunds beyond the statute 
of limitations.  As Duquesne agreed to extend the statute of 
limitations for losses carried back from 2003 to 2000, 
however, well-established law provides that the Government 
could demand repayment of any refunds issued for tax year 
2000.  As we see nothing in § 6501(k) that overcomes the 
effect of Duquesne’s agreement with the IRS, we reject the 
former’s argument that the tentative refunds here are outside 
the limitations period. 
 Section 6501 provides the framework for determining 
the statute of limitations.  When a tax year is within the 
statute of limitations, it is said to be “open;” when the 
limitations period expires, it is “closed.”  Under § 6501(a), a 
tax year generally remains open for three years after the 
taxpayer files its return.   
 But when a corporate taxpayer carries losses back to 
an earlier year, determining the statute of limitations is more 
complex.  A loss carryback uses capital losses incurred in one 
year to offset capital gains in an earlier year.  See 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 1211-12.  Though the statute of limitations is typically 
measured from the earlier year, § 6501(h) provides that the 
limitations period is extended to include the period applicable 
to the later year from which losses were carried back.  For 
example, if losses were carried back from 1992 to 1989, § 
6501(h) would extend the limitations period for 1989 until at 
least 1995 (that is, three years after 1992).  Subsection 
6501(k), on which Duquesne relies, provides in essence that 
the extended period provided by § 6501(h) also applies when 
the taxpayer carries back losses in order to claim a tentative 
refund.17   
                                                          
17 Subsection 6501(k) reads in full: 
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 Regardless whether the taxpayer carries back any 
losses at all, it may agree under § 6501(c)(4) to extend the 
limitations period for a given tax year.  If the taxpayer does 
so, the IRS may demand payment of additional taxes for that 
year on any ground.  See Calumet Industries, Inc. v. Comm’r 
of Internal Revenue, 95 T.C. 257, 278 (1990) ( “So long as 
the period for assessment is open under some provision in the 
year under consideration, we have jurisdiction to consider all 
items that may affect that taxable year”).  This rule has been 
applied repeatedly and specifically to allow the IRS to 
disallow losses carried back from a closed year.  See id.; see 
also Pacific Transport Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 
483 F.2d 209, 214-15 (9th Cir. 1973); Mecom v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 101 T.C. 374, 392-93 (1993) (collecting 
cases), aff’d, 40 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 1994) (table).  As a result, 
                                                                                                                                  
Tentative carryback adjustment assessment 
period.--In a case where an amount has been 
applied, credited, or refunded under section 
6411 (relating to tentative carryback and refund 
adjustments) by reason of a net operating loss 
carryback, a capital loss carryback, or a credit 
carryback (as defined in section 6511(d)(4)(C)) 
to a prior taxable year, the period described in 
subsection (a) of this section for assessing a 
deficiency for such prior taxable year shall be 
extended to include the period described in 
subsection (h) or (j), whichever is applicable; 
except that the amount which may be assessed 
solely by reason of this subsection shall not 
exceed the amount so applied, credited, or 
refunded under section 6411, reduced by any 
amount which may be assessed solely by reason 
of subsection (h) or (j), as the case may be. 
26 U.S.C. § 6501(k). 
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when the taxpayer agrees to extend the statute of limitations 
for a particular year, the IRS may disallow within the 
extended period any losses carried back to that year and 
demand repayment of the resulting refunds. 
 In this case, Duquesne agreed to extend the statute of 
limitations for tax year 2000.  After Duquesne carried back 
losses from 2003 to 2000 and received a tentative refund, the 
statute of limitations for tax year 2000 was extended until at 
least 2006 under § 6501(k).  It is undisputed that, before that 
period lapsed, Duquesne agreed to extend the statute of 
limitations and the IRS timely served Duquesne with a notice 
of deficiency based on losses carried back to 2000.  Though 
Duquesne contends that § 6501(k) somehow requires that tax 
year 2002 be within the statute of limitations as well, we see 
nothing in the subsection’s text to disturb well-settled law on 
the effect of a taxpayer’s agreement with the IRS.  As 2000 
was open by agreement with respect to the 2003 losses and 
the 2002 losses were carried back to 2000 as well, we 
conclude that the IRS is not time-barred from demanding 
repayment of the refunds resulting from any losses carried 
back to 2000. 
* * * * * 
 Though it is tempting to dismiss this case as merely 
further proof of the “difficult and torturous path” revealed 
when “we are constrained to enter the labyrinthine structured 
tax laws,” Ambac Industries, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 487 F.2d 463, 464 (2d Cir. 1973), it also serves to 
remind us that double deductions for consolidated taxpayers 
are treated differently from other aspects of tax law.  Rite-Aid 
created a gap in the regulations preventing them, and thus 
Duquesne concluded correctly that a door had opened in the 
consolidated-return regime.  It took a deduction for losses it 
incurred in 2001.  That is a ticket for only one ride; Duquesne 
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cannot do so again for the same economic loss.  It especially 
cannot do so when the IRS told it, when Reg. 1.337(d)-2T 
went effective, that a second ride on the same-loss train is 
closed to consolidated taxpayers.  Yet that is what Duquesne 
attempted in the hope that not paying for that ride would go 
unchallenged or, if challenged, its position would be upheld 
by a court.  Duquesne and our dissenting colleague believe 
that the authority for a loss given in this temporary regulation 
looks forward only, with no accounting for the same loss 
already taken.  We believe Ilfeld counsels otherwise and thus 
affirm the Tax Court’s judgment. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 According to the Majority, this case “concerns the 
continued vitality of the so-called Ilfeld doctrine for 
interpreting the Internal Revenue Code.” Majority Op. 3. Yet 
there can be no doubt that Ilfeld retains its vitality as a 
precedent of the Supreme Court, and Appellant Duquesne 
Light acknowledges as much. As I see it, the true question 
presented is whether Ilfeld applies where, as here, a hastily 
issued regulation authorizes the very actions that Ilfeld 
cautions against. The answer to that question depends on 
Ilfeld’s scope, the meaning of the applicable regulations 
(specifically § 1.337(d)-2T), and the significance of 
Duquesne’s compliance with those regulations. Because I see 
those issues differently than my colleagues, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I. The Scope of Ilfeld 
 Ilfeld seeks to prevent double deductions. To that end, 
the Supreme Court declared that “the practical equivalent of a 
double deduction” should not be sanctioned absent “a 
provision of the Act definitely requiring it.” Charles Ilfeld 
Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62, 68 (1934). The Majority 
interprets this language to require the taxpayer to identify 
three distinct layers of authorization. The first and second 
layers would require statutory authorization for each of the 
two deductions, while a third layer would need to provide 
“explicit approval” for the taxpayer to take both deductions. 
See Majority Op. 22. That means even if the Code separately 
allows Deduction A and Deduction B, the taxpayer could not 
take both deductions unless a provision authorized them to be 
taken simultaneously. This triple-authorization requirement, I 
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believe, goes above and beyond any rule envisioned by the 
Supreme Court.  
 As my colleagues acknowledge, disapproval of double 
deductions was not Ilfeld’s “case-specific holding.” See 
Majority Op. 23. In fact, the Ilfeld Court disallowed the 
taxpayer’s claimed deduction not on these overarching policy 
grounds, but because the then-applicable regulations 
prevented the taxpayer from recognizing the second claimed 
loss. 292 U.S. at 67. In that same vein, other courts have 
recognized that Ilfeld’s preclusion of double deductions 
except where “definitely require[d]” was not essential to the 
Court’s disposition. Cf. Marwais Steel Co. v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 354 F.2d 997, 998 (9th Cir. 1965) (“We 
follow taxpayer’s argument that part of what was there said 
was dicta.”). And when discussing the actual facts and 
regulations at issue in the case, the Ilfeld Court seemed to lay 
down a less rigorous rule, holding that: “In the absence of a 
provision in the Act or regulations that fairly may be read to 
authorize it, the deduction claimed is not allowable.” 292 
U.S. at 66 (emphasis added). 
Thus, two distinct standards (“definitely requires” or 
“fairly may be read to authorize”) can be extracted from 
Ilfeld. While it is true that the “definitely requires” standard 
supports the Majority’s triple-authorization rule, the “fairly 
may be read to authorize” standard suggests something 
between a watered-down clear statement rule and an 
interpretive aid. The Majority acknowledges that choosing 
between these standards is both difficult and crucial. See 
Majority Op. 19 (explaining that Ilfeld’s standard is 
“debatable” and that “‘[d]efinitely requiring’ a provision to 
authorize a double deduction . . . is a very high hurdle”). For 
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the reasons I shall explain, we should adopt the “fairly may 
be read to authorize” standard.  
A.  
 The disparate standards just mentioned can be 
harmonized, despite their apparent inconsistency. See, e.g., 
N.J. Air Nat’l Guard v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 677 F.2d 
276, 282 (3d Cir. 1982). As a general rule, courts should 
preclude double deductions unless “definitely require[d].” 
Ilfeld, 292 U.S. at 68. And when is a double deduction 
definitely required? When a statute or regulation “fairly may 
be read to authorize it.” Id. at 66. The taxpayer lost in Ilfeld 
because the Court could point to no authority that “purports 
to authorize double deduction of losses.” Id. at 68 (emphasis 
added). By requiring merely that the law “purport to 
authorize” a double deduction, the Court eschewed a reading 
like the Majority’s triple-authorization rule.  
B.  
 Apart from the language of Ilfeld itself, courts 
interpreting it have never required the triple authorization that 
the Majority articulates today. Just a year after Ilfeld was 
decided, our Court explained that the doctrine prohibits 
double deductions “except where act and regulation so 
provide.” Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Nat’l Casket Co., 78 
F.2d 940, 941 (3d Cir. 1935). Thirty years later, we stated that 
despite an obvious double (or even triple) deduction, we had 
“no choice . . . other than to apply [the applicable provision] 
literally as it is worded.” Miller’s Estate v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 400 F.2d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1968). We went 
on to say that “[t]he line of cases cited by the Commission 
descending from [Ilfeld], and allegedly supporting the rule of 
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tax interpretation that double deductions are not permitted 
absent express statutory mandate, is merely a variation on the 
‘avoid absurd results’ rule.” Id. at 411. We cautioned that 
“using broad equitable consideration[s], such as preventing 
multiple deductions, to solve problems raised by a tax statute 
is a dangerous course.” Id. at 411 n.12.1 Since this weak 
embrace, we have not cited Ilfeld.2    
                                              
 1 The Majority says our holding in Miller 
“distinguished Ilfeld on the ground that it concerned the 
peculiar income tax context of consolidated corporate income 
tax reporting.” Majority Op. 20 (internal quotations omitted). 
This reading of Miller ignores its primary holding that we 
must apply the law “literally as it is worded” and seizes on an 
additional reason provided by the court to distinguish Ilfeld. 
Miller, 400 F.2d at 411 (“In addition, this tax ‘rule’ has rarely 
been applied outside the peculiar income tax context of 
consolidated [returns].” (emphasis added)). In fact, the 
language quoted by the Majority was not meant to reaffirm 
Ilfeld in the consolidated returns context, but to express 
skepticism toward the rule generally, as indicated by the 
Miller court’s use of scare quotes as a rhetorical device. See 
id.  
 
 2 Our sister courts have taken a similarly modest view 
of Ilfeld’s scope. See Transco Expl. Co. v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 949 F.2d 837, 841 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[Ilfeld] is only 
an interpretive principle. It does not require or license us to 
rewrite the Code or the Secretary’s regulations. This court 
and others have balked in the past at revision of the tax code 
to reach what appears to be a more sensible result.”); Transco 
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 561 F.2d 1023, 1026 (1st Cir. 
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 The Supreme Court’s recent treatment of factually 
similar cases indicates that any such “clear statement” rule 
yields in the face of compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations. In Gitlitz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
the shareholders of an S corporation received a double tax 
benefit by excluding a debt cancellation from their income 
under one provision (rendering it nontaxable) and then 
including that same amount when calculating their stock basis 
through another provision (so that it increased their 
deductions for losses). 531 U.S. 206, 209–10 (2001). Because 
the shareholders’ deductions complied with sequencing 
provisions “expressly addressed in the [applicable] statute,” 
the Supreme Court held that the statute imposed no restriction 
on the deduction. Id. at 218–19. Without citing to Ilfeld, the 
majority closed by addressing Ilfeld’s principal concern:  
[C]ourts have discussed the policy concern that, 
if shareholders were permitted to pass through 
the discharge of indebtedness before reducing 
any tax attributes, the shareholders would 
wrongly experience a “double windfall”: They 
would be exempted from paying taxes on the 
full amount of the discharge of indebtedness, 
and they would be able to increase basis and 
deduct their previously suspended losses. 
Because the Code’s plain text permits the 
                                                                                                     
1977). But cf. Marwais Steel Co., 354 F.2d at 998 (applying 
Ilfeld even though “the argument of [the taxpayer] is very 
difficult to answer [and] seems near perfect in logic[, 
because] in human experience, most logic can be carried only 
so far”).  
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taxpayers here to receive these benefits, we 
need not address this policy concern. 
Id. at 219–20 (citation omitted).  
 I find it significant that the only citation to Ilfeld in the 
Gitlitz case was in Justice Breyer’s lone dissent. He opined 
that the statute was ambiguous and should be interpreted in 
favor of “closing, not maintaining, tax loopholes.” Id. at 223 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). And he lamented the fact that “[the 
majority’s] interpretation of the Code results in the ‘practical 
equivalent of [a] double deduction.’” Id. at 224 (quoting 
Ilfeld, 292 U.S. at 68). Like the Majority here, Justice Breyer 
would have precluded the double deduction because he could 
find no “clear declaration of intent by Congress” to allow it. 
Id.  
 Thus, the Gitlitz Court broke along the same 
theoretical lines as we do here. Justice Breyer’s view of 
Ilfeld’s scope would have required an explicit authorization in 
the Code allowing for both tax benefits to be reaped 
simultaneously. See id. The eight-justice majority, on the 
other hand, was satisfied that the combined provisions 
“permit[ted] the taxpayers to receive the[] benefits,” without 
requiring an additional statement that the two benefits could 
be concurrently utilized.3 Id. at 220. It goes without saying 
                                              
 3 The Majority notes that the Court in Gitlitz “did not 
purport to overrule [Ilfeld].” Majority Op. 21. This makes 
sense, given that the two cases are perfectly consistent. Each 
indicates that the judiciary’s policy concern of precluding 
double deductions must yield to positive law that provides 
otherwise. The Majority finds support in the fact that the 
Gitlitz majority “did not so much as mention” Ilfeld. Id. 
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that we must adhere to the opinion of the Court. And Gitlitz’s 
“permit” standard is quite closer to my “fairly may be read to 
authorize” standard than it is to the Majority’s triple-
authorization rule.  
C.  
 Next, the Majority’s triple-authorization test should be 
rejected because reasonable minds can differ as to when and 
how it would be satisfied. The decision of the Tax Court in 
Woods Investment Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
85 T.C. 274 (1985), is instructive in this regard. The Majority 
cites Woods as a case that clears Ilfeld’s “high hurdle.” See 
Majority Op. 19, 25–26. I cannot agree. Woods involved the 
interplay of a regulation and statute that, when applied 
simultaneously, could result in a double deduction. As the 
Majority explained:   
[Section] 1.1502-32 required the parent to 
adjust its basis in line with the subsidiary’s 
earnings and profits, and 26 U.S.C. § 312(k) 
required the parent to calculate those earnings 
and profits using a straight-line method of 
depreciation. Despite its awareness of the 
potential for straight-line depreciation to result 
in the practical equivalent of a double 
deduction, the IRS had failed to amend § 
1.1502-32 for almost twenty years.       
                                                                                                     
However (as noted above), the Gitlitz majority felt that it 
“need not address [the] policy concern” of duplicative 
benefits (i.e., the Ilfeld doctrine) and the citation to Ilfeld by 
Justice Breyer in dissent emphasizes Ilfeld’s applicability to 
the case. 531 U.S. at 219–20.  
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Majority Op. 26. It is difficult to understand how Woods—
where the IRS was aware of the potential of a loophole but 
failed to amend the scheme—is one where an on-point statute 
and an on-point regulation provide “explicit approval for 
duplicating the underlying economic loss,” as the Majority 
claims is necessary under Ilfeld. Majority Op. 22. If Woods 
passes muster, the Majority’s test is meaningless. Presumably 
for that reason, the Woods court did not make such a claim. 
Rather, it primarily relied on Ilfeld’s other standard—the 
“fairly may be read to authorize” standard that I advocate 
here—and wrote that the taxpayer should prevail because the 
regulations and statute “can fairly be read to authorize the 
result herein.” 85 T.C. at 283.  
 One final point of policy is worth mentioning: If we 
were to adopt the “fairly may be read to authorize” standard, 
we would not be opening the double-deduction floodgates. 
For example, I agree with the Majority’s excellent analysis 
that § 165 does not authorize a double deduction. See 
Majority Op. 22–23 (noting, among other things, that the 
language of § 165 “allows a single deduction for a single 
loss” and that the Court in Ilfeld rejected a similar provision). 
In fact, the Majority’s careful parsing of § 165 is just what the 
“fairly may be read to authorize” standard encourages—an 
examination of the text, history, and scheme to see whether 
the taxpayer’s interpretation is a fair one.4 
                                              
4 The preceding section hopefully makes clear that, 
contrary to the Majority’s claim, I do not interpret Ilfeld to 
permit double deductions merely “when they [are] not 
explicitly banned.” Majority Op. 34. A double deduction is 
not authorized by silence; rather it is allowed when a statute 
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II. The On-Point Regulations 
 The Majority does not dispute that Duquesne’s returns 
complied with the applicable regulations: § 1.1502-32 (basis 
calculation) and § 1.337(d)-2T (loss allowance). Majority Op. 
24. The meaning of those regulations is a point of contention, 
however.  
A. Section 1.337(d)-2T 
 Section 1.337(d)-2T says in paragraph (a)(1): “No 
deduction is allowed for any loss recognized by a member of 
a consolidated group with respect to the disposition of stock 
of a subsidiary.” Paragraph (c)(2) qualifies this rule by stating 
that the “[l]oss is not disallowed under paragraph (a)(1) of 
this section . . . to the extent the taxpayer establishes that the 
loss or basis is not attributable to the recognition of built-in 
gain.”5  
Section 1.337(d)-2T’s quadruple-negative construction 
leaves much to be desired, but its clumsy syntax doesn’t 
absolve us from enforcing it as written. Specifically, the 
provision says that losses such as the one Duquesne took here 
are “not disallowed.” While the Majority claims this language 
                                                                                                     
or regulation “fairly may be read to authorize” it. See Ilfeld, 
292 U.S. at 66.  
5 In my view, the Majority’s discussion of § 1.337(d)-
2T was off track from the outset because its triple-
authorization standard obliges the regulation to bear much 
more weight than the caselaw demands for the reasons I 
described in Part I. What is actually demanded of § 1.337(d)-
2T is that it can reasonably be interpreted (i.e., read fairly) to 
mean what the taxpayer claims it means. 
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does not positively authorize any deductions, I read it 
differently. My disagreement with the Majority on this score 
is simple: “not disallowed” can be read fairly to mean 
“allowed.” It has long been a convention of the English 
Language—as with arithmetic and logic—that two negatives 
make a positive. See, e.g., Robert Lowth, A Short 
Introduction to English Grammar: With Critical Notes 162 
(1762) (“Two Negatives in English destroy one another, or 
are equivalent to an Affirmative.”); Henry Watson Fowler, A 
Dictionary of Modern English Usage 374 (1926) (“You may 
treat a double negative expression as though it were formally 
as well as virtually a positive one.”). And the convention 
remains prevalent today, both in formal writing and in the 
vernacular. See, e.g., Martha Rose Shulman, Focaccia: One 
Basic Bread, Endless Delicious Options, N.Y. Times, May 
13, 2013 (“Focaccia is a flatbread, not unlike a very thick-
crusted pizza”); Tad Friend, Blowback, New Yorker, Oct. 25, 
2010 (“He grinned, seeming not displeased to be 
complicating the issue.”); Tom Jones, It’s Not Unusual, on 
Along Came Jones (Decca Records 1965) (explaining that 
“it’s not unusual” to do various everyday activities, such as 
“to go out at any time”).  
 If one accepts that “not disallowed” can reasonably be 
interpreted to mean “allowed,” then § 1.337(d)-2T—having 
been reduced from a quadruple negative to a double 
negative—becomes clearer. The combination of paragraphs 
(a)(1) and (c)(2) would read something like this: “No 
deduction is allowed for any loss recognized with respect to 
the disposition of stock of a subsidiary; however, that 
deduction is allowed to the extent the taxpayer establishes 
that the loss or basis is not attributable to the recognition of 
built-in gain.” Put more simply, a subsidiary’s stock loss is 
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allowed unless it relates to a built-in gain. It is undisputed that 
Duquesne would meet this standard. 
The Majority acknowledges that the foregoing 
interpretation results when § 1.337(d)-2T is “literally 
applied,” but claims that “[w]e know” this literal 
interpretation cannot be correct because it conflicts with an 
IRS notice issued alongside § 1.337(d)-2T. Majority Op. 33. 
Specifically, the Majority gives great weight to the IRS’s 
statement that it “believe[s] that a consolidated group should 
not be able to benefit more than once from one economic 
loss.” Id. (quoting IRS Notice 2002-18, 2002-1 C.B. 644 
(Mar. 9, 2002)). 
I see three principal issues with the Majority’s reliance 
on this notice. First, the full context of the language quoted by 
the Majority shows that the IRS did not mean to imply that 
§ 1.337(d)-2T—or any part of the then-in-effect regulatory 
scheme—prevented the deductions taken by Duquesne. 
Rather, the IRS’s belief that “a consolidated group should not 
be able to benefit more than once from one economic loss” 
was the impetus for its forthcoming regulations, namely, 
1.1502-35T:  
These rules [§§ 1.337(d) and 1.1502] do not 
disallow stock loss that reflects net operating 
losses or built-in asset losses of a subsidiary 
member. Nonetheless, the IRS and Treasury 
believe that a consolidated group should not be 
able to benefit more than once from one 
economic loss. Accordingly, the IRS and 
Treasury intend to issue regulations that will 
prevent a consolidated group from obtaining a 
tax benefit from both the utilization of a loss 
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from the disposition of stock (or another asset 
that reflects the basis of stock) and the 
utilization of a loss or deduction with respect to 
another asset that reflects the same economic 
loss. 
I.R.S. Notice 2002-18 (March 9, 2002). Thus, the IRS 
identified a defect in its regulations and explained that it 
would take corrective action to cure that defect. If anything, 
this shows that the IRS—at the time Duquesne took its 
deductions—did not believe there was a regulatory 
mechanism in place to prevent a double deduction.  
Second, even if the IRS notice meant what the 
Majority claims it does, I would not afford it such deference. 
While the IRS may “believe that a consolidated group” should 
never receive a double deduction, id. (emphasis added), the 
IRS must do more than believe something for it to become 
law. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (The Administrative 
Procedure Act). No matter what the IRS says in its informal 
notice publications, it cannot alter the plain meaning of its 
regulations. To allow otherwise would frustrate the scheme of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, essentially permitting the 
IRS “to create de facto a new regulation” through the back 
door. Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588, (2000). 
“Making regulatory programs effective is the purpose of 
rulemaking, in which the agency uses its ‘special expertise’ to 
formulate the best rule. But the purpose of interpretation is to 
determine the fair meaning of the rule. . . . Not to make 
policy, but to determine what policy has been made and 
promulgated by the agency[.]” Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 
133 S. Ct. 1326, 1340 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  
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And third, the Majority’s reliance on this IRS notice 
goes over and above any canon of judicial deference to 
agency interpretation. In this respect, it’s important to ask: 
what authority was the IRS interpreting to support its view 
that all double deductions should be disallowed? The IRS 
does not claim to be “implementing a statute,” so we know 
that it is not entitled to Chevron or Skidmore deference. See 
United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227–28 (2001). And 
since the IRS concedes that §§ 1.337(d) and 1.1502 did not 
disallow these deductions, its belief could not have been 
derived from those regulations—and therefore is not entitled 
to deference under Auer v. Robbins. 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) 
(holding that an agency’s interpretation of its “own 
regulations” is entitled to deference). Rather, the Majority 
seems to claim that the IRS notice was a gloss on Ilfeld itself, 
writing that the notice shows that Duquesne’s approach fails 
“so long as there is Ilfeld.” Majority Op. 33. I am aware of no 
caselaw that demands (or permits) a court to give such 
deference to an agency’s position regarding the status or 
strength of judicial precedent. Nor do I see any principled 
reason to do so. After all, “[i]t is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
B.  
 Linguistics aside, the Majority’s reading of § 1.337(d)-
2T is inconsistent with the IRS’s comprehensive regulatory 
scheme. The Majority argues that “the blinkered approach of 
Duquesne,” i.e., that it was entitled to follow the regulations 
that were before it, “does not stand so long as there is Ilfeld.” 
Majority Op. 33. But it seems unnatural for the IRS to write a 
regulation that literally authorizes a specific action, only to 
expect taxpayers to appreciate that the regulation is 
Case: 14-1743     Document: 003112662649     Page: 52      Date Filed: 06/29/2017
14 
 
undermined by common-law doctrines lurking in the 
shadows. And this interpretation would seem to vitiate the 
need for much of the IRS’s prior and subsequent regulations. 
Why have § 1.337(d)-2T or § 1.1502-32 in place if Ilfeld is 
the panacea for all consolidated-return, double-deduction ills?  
 Indeed, if Ilfeld carried such weight, many IRS 
regulations promulgated during the past several decades 
would be rendered superfluous. For example, after Woods, the 
IRS overhauled the consolidated return rules that had 
permitted the taxpayer to prevail in that case. T.D. 8560, 
1994-2 C.B. 200 (Aug. 15, 1994). Surely this reform was not 
just busywork. And after Rite Aid, the IRS scrambled to 
implement temporary regulations and warned taxpayers that it 
would soon adopt permanent ones to “prevent duplication of 
losses within a consolidated group on dispositions of member 
stock.” IRS Notice 2002-18, 2002-1 C.B. 644 (Mar. 9, 2002). 
It seems unlikely that the IRS would warn taxpayers that it 
would soon pass regulations to ban that which was already 
banned. 
Finally, the Majority counters that the temporary 
regulations created a “gap” that Duquesne exploited. Majority 
Op. 38. But the regulations were not so porous. Section 
1.337(d)-2T explicitly addresses the scenario that occurred 
here—losses by a consolidated group incurred on “disposition 
of stock of a subsidiary”—and then describes which losses 
are disallowed (those based on built-in gains) and which 
losses are not disallowed (those for which the “taxpayer 
establishes that the loss or basis is not attributable to the 
recognition of built-in gain”). This is a “gap” only in some 
philosophical sense. Because of the interstitial nature of 
regulatory schemes, not every factual permutation will be 
specified in the law. But a “gap” doesn’t exist whenever an 
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on-point regulation inadvertently authorizes a result that the 
agency later comes to regret. 
C. Section 1.1502-35T 
 Section 1.1502-35T doesn’t affect the meaning of 
§ 1.337(d)-2T. The Majority argues that § 1.1502-35T was 
the regulation actually intended to prevent Duquesne’s double 
deductions but “failed to prevent a double deduction here 
because of how the Duquesne group structured the relevant 
transactions in the wake of Rite Aid.” Majority Op. 32. But it 
doesn’t matter that § 1.1502-35T would—under a different 
set of facts—disallow deductions like the ones Duquesne took 
here. After all, neither the Tax Court nor the Government 
claims that § 1.1502-35T precluded the deductions actually 
taken by Duquesne in the relevant time period. And the 
Majority concedes that Duquesne “complied with § 1.1502-
35T in the sense that it did not violate it.” Majority Op. 32. I 
would require no more.   
 In this regard, the Majority seems to criticize 
Duquesne for acting during the Rite Aid interregnum. But it 
matters not whether “[t]he only purpose of [Duquesne] here 
was to escape taxation. . . . The fact that [Duquesne] desired 
to evade the law, as it is called, is immaterial, because the 
very meaning of a line in the law is that you intentionally may 
go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it.” Superior Oil 
Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390, 395–96 (1930). 
Duquesne was entitled to order its “affairs that [its] taxes 
shall be as low as possible;” and was “not bound to choose 
that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not 
even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.” Helvering v. 
Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) (Hand, J.) (citations 
omitted). For that reason, I disagree with my colleagues’ 
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implication that Duquesne should have accommodated the 
IRS by executing its transaction at a time when the regulatory 
scheme was more favorable to the Government.  
III. Duquesne’s Compliance 
 The foregoing discussion establishes (hopefully) that: 
(1) Ilfeld yields to a law that can fairly be read to authorize a 
double deduction; and (2) § 1.337(d)-2T can fairly be read to 
authorize a double deduction. These propositions lead 
ineluctably to the conclusion that, by complying with 
§ 1.337(d)-2T, Duquesne’s deductions did not run afoul of 
Ilfeld.  
A. 
 The Majority’s analysis is not so straightforward, 
looking as it does to the “structure and purpose of the broader 
regulatory regime,” Majority Op. 29, instead of the language 
of § 1.337(d)-2T. In that regard, I have no quarrel with the 
Majority’s convincing argument that Duquesne’s reading of 
§ 1.337(d)-2T runs contrary to the provision’s context and 
broad purposes. “Let us not forget, however, why context 
matters: It is a tool for understanding the terms of the law, not 
an excuse for rewriting them.” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 
2480, 2497 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). And “even the 
most formidable argument concerning [a law’s] purposes 
could not overcome the clarity [found] in the [law’s] text.” 
Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 607 n.4 (2012); see also 
Hanover Bank v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 369 U.S. 672, 
687 (1962) (“[W]e are not at liberty, notwithstanding the 
apparent tax-saving windfall bestowed upon taxpayers, to add 
to or alter the words employed to effect a purpose which does 
not appear on the face of the statute.”). 
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 Section 1.337(d)-2T may not be a model of clarity, but 
its tortured prose does not necessarily beget ambiguity. When 
the IRS writes that a deduction is “not disallowed,” we should 
accept that it is not. And without that ambiguity, it is not our 
place to investigate the structure and purpose of the scheme in 
order to restyle the language of the regulation. See Cent. Tr. 
Co., Rochester, N.Y. v. Official Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger 
Enters., 454 U.S. 354, 359 (1982) (“It is elementary that the 
meaning of a [law] must, in the first instance, be sought in the 
language in which the [law] is framed, and if that is plain, . . . 
the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its 
terms.” (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 
485 (1917))).  
 Nor does the seemingly unfair result mean that we 
should ignore § 1.337(d)-2T’s text. Duquesne’s duplicative 
deductions “would show only that the statutory scheme 
contains a flaw; they would not show that [§ 1.337(d)-2T] 
means the opposite of what it says.” King, 135 S. Ct. at 2503 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). And we are not at liberty to revise a 
regulation “just because the text as written creates an apparent 
anomaly.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 
2024, 2033 (2014).  
 Perhaps the Majority’s forecast of the IRS’s intent is 
correct and § 1.337(d)-2T’s plain meaning is inadvertent. 
That’s beside the point. If the IRS “enacted into law 
something different from what it intended, then it should 
amend the [law] to conform it to its intent. It is beyond our 
province to rescue [lawmakers] from [their] drafting errors, 
and to provide for what we might think . . . is the preferred 
result.” Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 




 Until today Ilfeld had never displaced both the Code 
and the relevant regulations that allowed the double 
deduction at issue. In fact, Ilfeld itself suggests that it would 
give way to permissive regulations. See 292 U.S. at 68 
(“There is nothing in the Act that purports to authorize double 
deduction of losses or in the regulations to suggest that the 
[IRS] construed any of its provisions to empower [the IRS] to 
prescribe a regulation that would permit consolidated returns 
to be made on the basis now claimed by [the parent].” 
(emphases added)). The deductions in Ilfeld violated the 
existing regulations, which was the basis of the decision. Id. 
at 67.  
Nor do any other Supreme Court cases make such a 
leap. See McLaughlin v. Pac. Lumber Co., 293 U.S. 351, 
355–56 (1934) (holding that the claimed deductions were 
inconsistent with the governing statute, where no on-point 
regulations permitted the duplicative deductions); United 
States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 683–84 (1969) (ruling 
against the taxpayer who did not refer to an on-point 
regulation—just to a bare, general Code provision that the 
Court interpreted, under Ilfeld, not to allow double-dipping). 
The same goes for our decisions applying Ilfeld in National 
Casket and Greif Cooperage: in neither case did an on-point 
regulation actually permit the double deduction challenged by 
the IRS. See Nat’l Casket, 78 F.2d at 942 (offering the 
qualification: “except where act and regulation so provide, 
double deduction of the same losses . . . is not permissible” 
(emphasis added)); Greif Cooperage Corp. v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 85 F.2d 365, 365 (3d Cir. 1936). 
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To the contrary, courts have set Ilfeld aside where, as 
here, two separate provisions combine to (perhaps 
accidentally) authorize the taxpayer’s double deduction. See 
Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 219–20 (explaining that a taxpayer may 
receive a “double windfall” because the “Code’s plain text” 
contained separate provisions that “permitted” taxpayers to 
“be exempted from paying taxes on the full amount of the 
discharge of indebtedness and [to] be able to increase basis 
and deduct their previously suspended losses”); Woods, 85 
T.C. at 282 (“If respondent believes that his regulations and 
section 312(k) together cause petitioner to receive a ‘double 
deduction,’ then respondent should use his broad power to 
amend his regulations.”).  
*  *  * 
 Duquesne concedes that it took a double deduction. 
Although that action might be criticized on policy grounds, it 
complied with the laws and regulations applicable at the time. 
For that reason, I respectfully dissent.  
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